The
problem in Mozambique is the winner-takes-all politics. If it is possible even
to imagine that the president can be from the ruling party FRELIMO and the
provincial governors from other parties and vice-versa; if it is accepted that
national unity is not necessarily the same as national homogeneity; if the
armed opposition RENAMO’s social base is allocated its share of national
resources, and the situation of the majority of Mozambicans improves, the
country’s conflict will be resolved.
Introduction
Mozambique
is currently facing one of the most challenging tests of its capacity to
resolve the country’s political, economic and social challenges.
Politically,
a ceasefire agreement signed between the Government of Frente de Libertação de
Moçambique (FRELIMO) and the main opposition party, the Resistência Nacional de
Moçambique (RENAMO) on 24 August 2014 was short-lived. It only served to clear
the way for the country’s general elections on 15 October 2014, at which time
the highly contested results by RENAMO brought about another round of military
conflict.
Economically,
the national currency, Metical, has been consistently devaluing against, for
example, the South African Rand, the American dollar and the Euro, when
potential gains from newly discovered resources (e.g. offshore gas) have failed
to produce any tangible improvement to people’s lives. This, in conjunction with
the discovery of hidden debt of 1, 4 billion USD, led partners like the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the British to
suspend further financial aid to the country. It is therefore expected that
these political and economic developments will lead to political upheaval if
the Government does not address questions fast and adequately.[1]
To
better understand Mozambique’s current political developments from a
political-historical perspective, Fredson Guilengue, Programme Manager at the
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southern Africa (RLS) interviewed historian Michel
Cahen (MC). Michel Cahen is an authority on Portuguese colonisation in Africa
and a political analyst of Portuguese speaking African Countries (PALOPs). He
is the Director of Research at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
(CNRS) at “Les Afriques dans le monde” Research Centre at the Institute for
Political Studies in Bordeaux, France. As an accredited historian of Mozambican
and Angolan contemporary history, Cahen has written extensively on Mozambique’s
political developments.
RLS:
Mozambique’s electoral processes have always been highly contested due to
allegations of electoral fraud by the ruling party Frente de Libertação de
Moçambique (FRELIMO) as well as other factors, including a general perception
that political power should alternate between parties to achieve a mature
democracy. to what extent do frelimo’s victories threaten de facto
democratic development in Mozambique?
MC:
This is a complex question, as it must be viewed in different historical
periods. Despite the fact that the anticolonial liberation war was carried out
in probably no more than fifteen percent of the country’s territory (an aspect
that in terms of a guerrilla-like war is already very significant), there
should be no doubt that at independence in 1975, if the country had not opted
for a single-party state system, FRELIMO would still have had an eighty percent
chance of winning. FRELIMO had the necessary legitimacy of the gun; it had defeated
the Portuguese and it was a liberation movement for independence.
However,
the single-party system severely divided the Mozambican population. With the
fusion of party and state there was no space for any independent structure to
correct mistakes. Only the highest structures within FRELIMO were allowed to
criticise the government. An example of this was the famous Samora Machel’s
presidential “offensive” in 1983.[2] This was the highest structure putting
pressure on the medium structures of the state hierarchy. It was also followed
by the paradigm of authoritarian modernisation without any social
gains for the sector of the population defended by FRELIMO. This paradigm
expressed the idea that the peasantry had to be forcefully modernised by living
in rural cities, the so-called “communal villages”. The consequence of building
these villages was an agronomic, cultural and political catastrophe for the
country and deeply divided the Mozambican population. The civil war in
Mozambique was not a peasant revolution, but the peasants used the structures
of the guerrilla, introduced by outsiders, to protect themselves against the
state foisting authoritarian modernisation upon them.
There
is an intense political culture instilled by FRELIMO in which electoral fraud
emerges as a local responsibility. A local party member does not require any
orientation from the central committee to organise electoral fraud. The member
engages in this type of activity because the premise is that RENAMO should
never be allowed to win. A doctorate student of mine from Mozambique who
conducted a study in the south of the country explained how a relative of his,
who was an electoral officer at a voting station, destroyed ballots to prevent
the opposition from winning. So for me the real question to ask would be to
what extent did fraud affect electoral results in Mozambique? It is also very
difficult to report fraud because FRELIMO possesses more qualified staff than
the other parties and controls the entire state apparatus. Although the
Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (MDM) also has qualified cadres, it is
still a small party.[3] RENAMO is a powerful party but suffers a severe lack of
personnel. Thus, at many voting stations RENAMO or MDM observers were either
not properly trained, had been freshly recruited just prior to the process, or
could even have been appointed by FRELIMO.
Meanwhile,
it is the concept of the party-nation that poses the most serious threat to
democratic advancement in Mozambique. This ideal also comprises the rule that
the “winner takes all”.[4] As a result of this system, we find in provinces
like Zambézia and Nampula, where the population has always voted for the
opposition, all positions of power are occupied by FRELIMO members, i.e. the
governor, all district administrators, all managers of public services, all
private bank managers and all the local leaders recognised by the government
are FRELIMO supporters. This situation causes despair and anger, not only with
members of the opposition, but also among the local population. In this
instance, the “winner takes all” principle nullifies the vote. It is different
in urban areas declared as municipalities because municipal elections take
place. There are only fifty-eight municipalities in Mozambique, so there are no
elections in the rest of the territory, no decentralisation - only
de-concentration.
Again
it is the “winner takes all” principle that is firmly rooted in FRELIMO’s
cultural politic that most threatens democratic development in Mozambique.
Because a person’s vote doesn’t appear to change anything, we see a situation
where so many people abstain from the voting process. This happened some years
after the massive fraud of 1999 when RENAMO-dominated territories stopped
voting and was evidenced by electoral results in which FRELIMO’s electoral
percentage continued increasing to sixty-two percent in 2004, while the actual
number of votes decreased. Simultaneously, RENAMO’s electorate slowly
disappeared. People once again started voting after the 2013 military crises
when Dhlakama rebranded himself as a powerful leader. The electorate decided to
vote again because they thought they were voting for change, but once again
nothing changed at regional and local levels even when the opposition won. It
is obvious that the party capturing the majority of votes at national level
should form the government, but at local level there should be space for
opposition members and local leaders. This currently doesn’t exist. There is no
political representation and this model is a serious threat to democracy. By
this I am not implying that RENAMO is a beacon of democracy. It is yet another
authoritarian party with a poor democratic
concept.
RLS:
Many people associate the current political instability in Mozambique with the
discovery of mineral resources. This association is partially based on the
economic theory of “resource curse”. However, there is not necessarily a direct
relationship between the abundance of natural resources and a political crisis.
Are there factors that could influence this
relationship?
MC:
I think such analyses have to differentiate between national and local
circumstances. At local level, the people from Cabo Delgado, at the
extreme-north of Mozambique, where gas and petrol have been found, are already
noticing a number of investments from which no social benefits are forthcoming.
From a national perspective, I believe that the poverty level of Mozambicans
today is no worse than twenty years ago. However, after twenty years the poor are
noticing that there is a small minority that is grabbing everything and
enriching itself. So while the poverty level of the majority remains static,
they are observing a rising bourgeoisie. This dissatisfaction has not yet been
politically manifested.
The
2008/2010 riots in Maputo, when the cost of the price of petrol and cost of
living increased, were only social uprisings to ask the “boss” for a favour. I
still remember a young man who was burning a tyre during the riots saying, “We
are crying for our father”. This meant that they were asking Guebuza who was
then the president to treat them well. It was still the subject demanding
something from his master. It was akin to asking for a favour and not for a
right within the republic. These riots had no political impact.
However,
it is important to remember that during the 2013 municipal elections a year
prior to the general elections in 2014, MDM obtained 45% of the results in
Maputo and Matola municipalities, and it is highly probable that it might have won
the elections. Surprisingly, there was a two-hour power cut at the precise
moment when the votes were being counted.
For
an opposition party to obtain 45% at the heart of FRELIMO’s social base was an
enormous achievement. I was also very impressed with the excellent “score”
obtained by RENAMO in the 2014 general elections in which it obtained 20% in
Maputo. This percentage cannot only be attributed to the migrants from northern
Mozambique who live in Maputo. This means that there is a section of the poor
who voted for RENAMO to express dissatisfaction with FRELIMO. This is
politically important. An imminent increase in the price of transport, together
with the devaluation of the metical in relation to the rand and the dollar,
will certainly trigger riots which may have some political overtones, something
completely different from the unrest of 2008/2010.
I
would say that today there are different facets to the relationship between
mineral abundance and political turmoil. People are well-informed about new
mineral resources and there is no longer widespread civil war. Furthermore,
people are noticing the country’s bourgeoisie becoming ever richer. Everyone
knows that Guebuza is behind EMATUM and probably also behind PROÍNDICUS and so
on.
RLS:
President Nyusi began his mandate demonstrating an apparent sensibility to the
issues raised by RENAMO. recently, however, he seems to have taken a harder
stance in relation to renamo’s project of autonomous provinces. This gives the
impression that FRELIMO is refusing to structurally change the state. for
example, FRELIMO has taken the initiative of designing and approving the
“status of the opposition leader” giving it some direct benefits. On the other
hand, it has also refused to change the state structure to accommodate RENAMO
in the process of governance in Mozambique. Is this attitude new or has it
always been part of the party’s strategy of state
building?
MC:
I think we have all the necessary elements to be able to answer this question.
This attitude is inherently part of FRELIMO’s political culture. As I said,
FRELIMO sees itself as a party-nation so it is considers it inconceivable to
lose power as it is the nation. FRELIMO has to maintain power everywhere and by
any means. Because RENAMO demanded recognition as the winner of only six of the
eleven provinces, I am of the opinion that a constitutional amendment would
allow the provincial assemblies to elect governors. These governors would then
oversee the district and the local structures. However, FRELIMO refused to make
any constitutional amendment. In fact, even without a constitutional amendment,
President Nyusi himself could have simply appointed some RENAMO elected
governors. But he preferred not to do so.
At
the beginning Nyusi was attempting to appear more accessible and open-minded
than Guebuza. Thereby directly opposing Guebuza. It is also important to stress
that Guebuza was still the president of FRELIMO and, according to its statutes,
every militant is bound to obey the president of the party. This would imply
that Nyusi, the country’s president, was beholden to Guebuza, the party’s
president, meaning that the functioning of the republic depended on the
statutes of a private entity being the party.
Meanwhile,
Nyusi’s successful removal of Guebuza as FRELIMO’s president was a narrow
victory as it effectively fused the state and the party. With Guebuza’s ousting
as party president, FRELIMO effectively confirmed that the President of the
Republic must also be the party’s president. This was very unfortunate as it is
exactly this system that creates “Guebuzas”. Now that Guebuza’s influence
within the party has weakened, Nyusi has started applying a military solution
to the country’s political problems. One should also not ignore that Nyusi was
Guebuza’s Minister of Defence. It was Nyusi who led the war against RENAMO in
2013/2014. We can always ask questions such as: Is it possible that Nyusi wants
to negotiate peace with RENAMO but is limited by lack of full control over the
military? Or is he just playing a double role? Nonetheless, Nyusi must accept
ultimate responsibility because the three attempts to kill Dhlakama, the
attempt to kill RENAMO’s General Secretary, the assassination of RENAMO’s
Delegate to the State National Security Council were all orchestrated by the
security forces under Nyusi’s control. If you read the declarations of the
latest meeting of FRELIMO’s Central Committee, it is clear that there will be
no negotiation without the complete disarmament of RENAMO.
Today,
neither FRELIMO nor RENAMO want to negotiate. Remember that Dhlakama promised
to assume control of the six provinces in March, but we are now in April and
nothing has transpired. I believe he accepts that he doesn’t have the necessary
military might to capture large towns such as Beira and Quelimane, but he is
going to invest in a guerrilla war. He possesses the means to do so. In
Southern Mozambique the clashes are not yet as many as in the northern and
central parts of the country. This is probably because RENAMO’s soldiers have
received direct orders from Dhlakama not to expand the attacks. I think
Dhlakama will escalate the conflict gradually to strengthen his influence over
the government. Even the Catholic Church, with its apparent personal contacts
with him, has been unable to achieve anything. Nobody wants to negotiate.[6]
FRELIMO doesn’t want to negotiate because it believes that it can annihilate
RENAMO, as was the case with UNITA in Angola, which I believe was a huge mistake.
RENAMO doesn’t want to negotiate because it needs to weight the power balance
in its favour.
RLS:
RENAMO’s disarmament seems to be regarded by many forces within Mozambique as
the determinant of effective peace. this argument suggests that the political
uprising in mozambique is linked to the possession of conventional arms by
RENAMO. 1) what possible scenario can we expect for Mozambique if the objective
of disarming RENAMO is not achieved? 2) does RENAMO’s disarmament represent the
entire elimination of all forms of violent political rebellions in
Mozambique?
MC:
It’s true that RENAMO possesses arms but I don’t believe they have heavy
artillery. They don’t have tanks; they have 60 and 88 mm mortars, RPG-7’s and
Kalashnikovs. Most of the arms were captured from FRELIMO military bases. It is
also rumoured that in 2014 a train-load of modern military equipment coming
from Zimbabwe was intercepted by RENAMO. I think RENAMO has no problem either
buying or capturing military equipment for its troops. But this doesn’t mean
that RENAMO has sufficient military equipment to supply all the young men who
have recently joined its forces.
Irrespective
of whether RENAMO has the military force or not, it doesn’t represent an obstacle
to peace in Mozambique because the country has a political not a military
problem. This is a merely a military expression of a political problem. If the
country is able to resolve the challenges arising from the “winner takes all”
system; if it’s possible even to imagine that the country’s president can be
from FRELIMO and the provincial governors from other parties and vice-versa; if
it is accepted that national unity is not necessarily the same as national
homogeneity; if RENAMO’s social base is allocated its share, particularly in
respect of the newly identified resources, and the social situation of the
majority of Mozambicans improves, then the RENAMO problem is easily resolved.
RENAMO’s forces wish to be socially reintegrated either into the army or police
forces. The country needs political reform to end the homogenised vision of the
Mozambican nation. It’s important to understand that Mozambique is nothing more
than “a colonial space” created by the coloniser; that it is not a nation and
that there are twenty-five different ethnic groups of which twenty-three remain
outside the existing geographic borders. The only possibility of achieving
national unity is to build a republic that can provide economic and social
advancement for the whole nation. Progress will first bring a political and
later a cultural identity to the nation. FRELIMO’s current behaviour is
fostering anti-state sentiment as people attempt to protect themselves from the
state instead of integrating themselves into it.
In
response to your second question, it would have been advantageous if
progressive Mozambican NGOs had formed a civil, pacifistic political party to
organise demonstrations, etc., however, in the absence of this type of party or
form of protest, and hypothesising the end of RENAMO, I don’t think there will
be other military rebellions in Mozambique. But this considers RENAMO already
dead, which I doubt will happen!
RLS:
Is it possible to link the partization [7] of the state in
Mozambique to the lack of trust in the (technical) structures responsible for
the administration of the electoral processes?
MC:
I guess you must be referring to the problem between the National Electoral
Commission (CNE) and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Management (STAE).
[8] There is a very serious problem in this regard which has never been
addressed, not even when the last electoral act was amended at RENAMO’s
insistence. While the CNE is a public institution the STAE, which literally
performs all the major tasks, is under the control of the Ministry of Public
Administration. Thus all its high level personnel are FRELIMO members. These
people will always side with FRELIMO and produces, what I would call,
“structural fraud”. Structural fraud begins at voter registration, a process
that is not uniformly structured across the country. Everyone is aware that the
electoral personnel are FRELIMO members and that one can have a better life as
a FRELIMO supporter. This is a form of daily neopatrimonialism where permanent
pressure is applied to force people to side with power. Poverty per se doesn’t
cause revolt as it only pushes people to look for protection. So people seek
relatives to assist them get what they are actually looking for.
It’s
an absolute necessity to “de-particise the state”. During Guebuza’s two
mandates he “re-particized” the state, while during Chissano’s mandates (after
the single party system from 1994 to 2004), the state was more important than
the party. With Guebuza the party returned to being more important than the
state. The party now again fully governs the state. Hence there is no
conceptual problem to expect public servants to participate in FRELIMO’s
meetings during working hours. Public servants at all levels are invited to
participate in these meetings and are expected to attend. No other political
party is allowed to do the same. Actually, there was agreement between two
teams of negotiators on the “departization of the state”, one of RENAMO’s
demands, but a day later it was rejected by FRELIMO’s parliamentary majority.
The “partization” of the Mozambican state apparatus by FRELIMO is a very deeply
held conviction. As the party has always governed Mozambique in this way,
people tend to believe that FRELIMO is the father of the state. The consequence
is that the partization of the state apparatus has never been questioned
because it is so firmly ingrained in the population’s understanding of its
relationship with the state.
RLS:
The disagreements during the so-called “political dialogue” (2013 - 2015) between
RENAMO and the government of Mozambique started with the implementation of the
agreement for “departization” of the state and degenerated into salvos about
military issues. Is there any possibility of a negotiated solution for
Mozambique, or is it definitely necessary that one of the actors should be
completely eliminated so that the other can claim hegemony over the country’s
politics?
MC:
I think the Angolan solution in which the death of Jonas Savimbi meant peace
for the country is not applicable to the Mozambican situation. Although Angola
is also geographically and ethnically heterogeneous, the wealth of the
politically powerful subordinates literally everyone. Even with the advent of
the exploitation of extensive mineral resources in Mozambique, the politically
powerful will never have enough money to subjugate everyone. In fact, there is
a joke in Luanda that to get rich quickly one just has to create an opposition
party that can later be “bought” by the regime. It’s difficult to apply this to
Mozambique.
Hegemony
and homogeneity are two different things. In such a heterogeneous country like
Mozambique in geographic and historical terms hegemony would be less probable
and undesirable. Although it would apparently bring peace, it would be what I
would call an “armed peace” and not democracy. We have to resolve the crisis of
political representation to allow more democracy and more popular expression.
Mozambique needs to create national unity in the sense of allowing everybody to
live and experience social and economic progress.
RLS:
In line with the previous question, do you believe that the physical
elimination of RENAMO’s leader could spell the end of war in Mozambique and the
weakening of RENAMO to a level similar to UNITA in Angola?
MC:
They have been and are still trying to do it. This would be bad. What most
people have not yet understood is that within RENAMO Dhlakama is a moderate.
There are many people within the party who yearn to once again take up arms. It
is Dhlakama who has avoided this route. If Dhlakama dies who will assume power?
The son of André Matsangaissa who is said to have returned from Kenya and
appears to be a good soldier? Is it Ivone Soares? In any case, if Dhlakama dies
a more radical wing within RENAMO might assume control. Maybe this is
what the government wants - a military confrontation that FRELIMO is convinced
it will win. FRELIMO believes that it will physically eliminate Dhlakama and
militarily eliminate RENAMO because it still ascribes RENAMO’s existence to the
backing of the South African apartheid regime. Because the apartheid regime no
longer exists, FRELIMO thinks RENAMO is weak. It is a huge mistake. However,
FRELIMO is not thinking about the economic crisis which is driving the country
into a depression.
RENAMO
is very different from UNITA. UNITA was a conventional army with battalions,
etc. while RENAMO is a soft guerrilla movement making it very difficult to
defeat. Even the death of Dhlakama may not resolve the problem as the
succession debate has already begun within the party. There is currently a full
crisis of political representation in Mozambique. The only good thing that
could happen in Mozambique would be a social revolution in the cities. The
cities are FRELIMO’s strongholds and if the populace demand peace it could
potentially change the situation.
RLS:
Mozambique is under a serious risk of bankruptcy due to the so-called “tuna
bonds” and others recently revealed to be 1, 4 billion dollars. to what extent
does Nyusi have the ability to resolve this crisis or does this problem lie
more at the level of the party itself?
MC:
I’m a historian and not an economist but I don’t believe Nyusi can effectively
meet this challenge. To do so he would need to force foreign companies to pay
taxes. They enter the country under very favourable agreements, to the extent
that workers in Mozambique pay more taxes than what these capitalist companies
do. Yes, it’s a classical situation worldwide, but it’s more damaging to a
country like Mozambique. On the other hand, it’s important to stress that it is
the FRELIMO bourgeoisie that benefits the most from these bonds that have
created the economic crisis. Pressured by the IMF, Nyusi definitely needs to
take action, but this will not completely resolve the economic crisis. At the
latest meeting of FRELIMO’s Central Committee one more anticorruption plan was
agreed upon to convince the public that corruption is treated seriously when,
in fact, nothing is being done. For example, in the cases of EMATUM and
PROÍNDICUS, the first course of action should have been to arrest former
president Armando Guebuza and former Finance Minister Manuel Chang. Both are
behind the current crisis with both authorising and financially benefitting
from the bonds.
RLS:
The US State Department report on human rights (2015) exposed countless
violations of human rights in Mozambique including acts of repression of voices
in disagreement with the FRELIMO government. in fact, the same report points to
the assassination of Professor Cistac as being politically motivated. this year
(2016) assassinations and attempts of selective assassination of opposing
voices are taking place (canal de moçambique).[9] to what extent can repression
and assassination of political opposition voices in Mozambique be associated
with a probable historical legacy of political struggles for
independence?
MC:
I think the current situation where security services are trying to physically
eliminate RENAMO cadres is comparable to the military dictatorships in Latin
America in the 1960s and 70s. It’s not a historical legacy. As a historian I
have to apply the concepts very well and would not yet classify the Mozambican
regime as a fascist regime. But this behaviour is similar that of any
extreme-right military dictatorship in the 1960s and 70s. To indiscriminately
kill everyone considered subversives. Because Mozambique is still predominantly
a rural country, this attitude will not weaken RENAMO but push it back into the
bush. The outcome will be more civil war. It is important not to ignore that
this might actually be FRELIMO’s strategy, eliminate the leader in order to
stop or avoid negotiations. This also happens in the conflict between Israel
and Palestine. Whenever there is an attempt to negotiate, Israel expands its
colonies in the West Bank, or following a selective assassination there is the
obvious retaliation by the Palestinians. This does, however, demonstrate a
sinister side of the security services in Mozambique - assassination for
political gain. There is the belief that if RENAMO expanded its military
actions the war would be over in 15 days. The government would easily fall
because, although it is extremely violent, internally it remains very corrupt.
I
cannot entirely deny that this is an historical attitude considering FRELIMO
viewing itself as the nation and, in this context, the opposition is
illegitimate so must be eliminated. Whoever is against FRELIMO is also
against the nation. In this sense you become an enemy and have to be
eliminated. There is a historical continuity but it’s important to stress that
because it is happening now and not five years ago, indicates that that the
security services are employing certain behavioural traits similar to those
historically used by South American or South African extreme-right regimes.
0 comentários:
Post a Comment