Since October 2017, a violent insurgent group—invariably called
al-Shabaab or Ahlu Sunna wa Jama (ASWJ)—has conducted some 139 attacks, with
more than 350 civilian and military deaths. There is not a consensus about the
group’s identity, objectives, recruitment, or funding sources. Moreover, there
is a hotly contested debate about linkages between local, regional, and
international extremist networks.
Some scholars, in contrast to those promoting an international terrorist
nexus, have noted that ethnic tensions in this region of northern Mozambique
are a contributing factor to the conflict. Eric Morier-Genoud, for example,
suggests that the Mweni, which reside on the coast and are one of the main
ethnic groups in the region, have been recruits for ASWJ. He explains that the
Mweni have felt “marginalised for decades by migration into their area, a lack
of economic development, and their neighbours’ political clout.” These other
neighbours include the Makua, which are the largest ethnic group and live in
the mountainous interior, and the Makonde, who live along the border with
Tanzania and claim President Nyusi as a native son.
Through Fraym’s human geography data, we wanted to examine the ethnic
dimension to the conflict. Specifically, does ASWJ operate primarily in Mweni
territory?
By combining a base layer map depicting the percentage of Makua language
speakers—which is the only one of the three languages available in survey
data–with attack locations, we discovered that most of the attacks (93 percent)
have been conducted in areas with a low-density of Makua speakers. This finding
affirms explanations that stress the insurgency’s local roots, especially its
ethnic component.
The correlation between attack locations and low-density Makua speaking
regions raised a second question: how does Fraym data account for the cluster
of attacks in Cabo Delgado’s Makua areas in the interior and Makonde
communities on the northcentral border with Tanzania?
To address this paradox, we used time-lapsed animation to track the
group’s attacks from 2017 to mid-2019. This resulted in two insights. In 2018,
ASWJ indeed conducted several probing attacks into Makua and Makonde
territories. However, it appears that ASWJ in 2019 switched its tactics,
refocusing on its operations on the coast and road networks instead of
continuing to expand its footprint into Cabo Delgado’s interior.
This shift in its operations could indicate that ASWJ had failed to
recruit a sufficient number of fighters in non-Mweni areas and struggled to
operate in less familiar terrain in the centre and northcentral border region.
In conclusion, Fraym’s unique data enabled us to test some of the
competing explanations for the conflict in northern Mozambique. We concluded
that ethnicity is an important factor—perhaps more so than previously
assessed—in the insurgency. Fraym’s pairing of ethnic, religious, and
topographic layers with attack data raises questions about ASWJ’s support base
and its capacity to expand out of its strongholds along the predominately
ethnic Mweni coastline.
By Judd Devermont
Senior Fraym Advisor
National
intelligence officer for Africa from 2015 to 2018
Central
Intelligence Agency’s senior political analyst on sub-Saharan Africa from 2013
to 2015
National
Security Council director for Somalia, Nigeria, the Sahel, and the African
Union from 2011 to 2013
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