By James Hall
Analysis
in brief: Southern Africa’s first terrorist
insurgency is casting doubt on progress to commercially exploit Mozambique’s
promising natural gas deposits. Mozambique’s government has been unable to
thwart the terror attacks, offering little hope for relief to multinational
energy giants at work in the country.
The reaction of two
of the largest oil companies at work in Mozambique, Total and ExxonMobil, to
the insurgency of Islamist militants in the country’s northern Cabo Delgado
province has signalled their perception of where the conflict is headed.
Meeting with government authorities, the company officials did not press for a
cessastion of violence that was threatening their investments, but merely for
the deployment of more troops to guard their operations. Some oil installations
have already been attacked. By their request for security, the oil majors were
admitting there was no immediate solution to the terror operations now five
years old, or their faith that government has a plan or ability to suppress the
insurrection. Rather, the oil firms want protection beyond what their private
security companies can provide. Clearly, they believe Mozambique is being
challenged by a long-term problem; one that the Southern African Development
Community has finally admitted has regional repercussions. Ironically, through
their unkept promises to the people of Cabo Delgado, the energy companies are
also responsible for their unsettled security situation.
An insurgency from
the north takes root in Southern Africa
If energy companies
are nervous about the Cabo Delgado insurgency, they require introspection
regarding their own culpability. Reports have documented the disatisfaction of
the region’s residents that they have not received the promised benefits of oil
production and have suffered evictions, loss of livelihoods and environmental
destruction. The militants have exploited these grievances to gain adherents
and to prolong their insurgency. Attacks on oil infrastructure have been a
distant after-thought for the Ansar al-Sunna (“Supporters of the Tradition”).
The followers of Kenya’s radical cleric Aboud Rogo settled in Tanzania after
his death in 2012 before moving southward one more country and appearing in
Cabo Delgado in 2015. Five years before, in 2010, the US energy company
Anadarko discovered a major gas reserve off the Cabo Delgado coast. Another
large field was found by Italy’s ENI the following year, 2011. A rush followed
as the world’s major energy companies descended upon the province with
assurances that the locals would be impoverished no more. That was not to be,
as local populations were evicted from ancestral lands to make way for oil and
gas facilities, and jobs on a large scale failed to materlise. Meanwhile, Ansar
al-Sunna announced itself by storming mosques with weaponry, declaring that the
Islam practiced in Mozambique was unfaithful to their vision of the Prophent
Mohammed, and that they would set up an Islamic Caliphate in the area. When
local populations rejected their movement, years of brutal attacks on civilians
ensued. Beheadings were the terror act of choice, and schools and clinics were
targeted as being instruments of Western culture that was opposed by the
extremists. Since the terror campaign against civilians began in 2017, 700
people have been killed and many more injured. Insurgents are believed to
finance their activites through trade in illegal drugs and ivory.
People who have been
displaced gather as food is distributed in Mocímboa da Praia, Cabo Delgado
Mozambique’s
military, distracted by political infighting, sometimes armed, between the
ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) party and the perennial opposition
party the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), mounted a desultory
counter-insurgency. The militant group’s disorganisation – Ansar al-Sunna split
into as many as eight separate cells – prevented a coherent anti-state campaign
but permitted attacks to continue in an ad hoc manner. Mercenaries from
Somalia’s terror group al-Shabaab were hired by Ansar al-Sunna to assist with
attacks, although there was no formal alliance between the two groups. Nor was
ISIS an ally, at least until mid-2018 when that group announced its presence
with an attack on security forces. By this time, the counter-productiveness
of bloody attacks against civilians was tacitly acknowledged by Ansar al-Sunna,
which changed tactics by appealing to widespread resentment against social
injustices. One of the people’s greviences – widespread youth unemployment
despite the energy sector boom – was successfully exploited to recruit youth
members. Portuguese, the official language of Mozambique, replaced East African
Swahili as the group’s means of communication, and foreigners have been
outnumbered by Mozambican members, mostly from the districts of Macomia,
Mocimboa da Praia and Palma. Thus, what began as a foreign incursion into Cabo
Delgado motivated by a religious agenda has now become a militant social
movement. The most potent counter-insurgency, then, would be state programmes
focused on reducing poverty, improving social services and providing youth
employment. However, such a plan is not only difficult for an impoverished
country devastated by cyclones in 2019, but is the type of massive
people-oriented project that has proved beyond the ability or interest of a
corruption-plagued government.
Impact on the energy
sector
Several factors
impacting the future of Mozambique’s energy sector are occuring at a decisive
time, when energy companies must fully commit with their Final Investment
Decisions (FIDs). The stakes are huge. Africa’s three largest liquid natural
gas (LNG) projects are in Cabo Delgado: Total’s US$ 20 billion Mozambique LNG
Project, ENI/ExxonMobil’s US$ 4.7 billion Coral LFNG Project, and the US$ 30
billion ExxonMobil/ENI/CNPC Rovuma LNG Project. Falling energy prices worsened
by the Covid-19 pandemic’s drag on energy demand is a discouraging but
ultimately temporary matter. Such cycles are part of the energy business. More
of a wild card is the Cabo Delgado security situation, which changed for the
worse as the pandemic struck. On 23 March, militants took the fight to the
military for the first time, attacking police and army installations in Ocimboa
da Praia and routing the security forces. Then in another reversal of its
previous tactic of terrorising civilians, Ansar al-Sunna fighters distributed
food to villagers. Reportedly, the gesture contributed to local populations’
more receptive attitude toward the extremist group; an attitude grounded in
growing resentment of the consequences of energy exploration. Cabo Delgado
citizens are seeing that what is happening to them is a repeat of what occurred
in Tete Province, when 60% of the residents’ land – farms, homes, shops, whole
villages – were given to coal extraction companies. Locals now know that LNG
extraction is occuring offshore, offering no jobs, while pipelines and on-shore
support facilities are causing mass evictions. Physical relocation or loss of
access to farmlands has affected 1500 families and some 3000 fishermen have
lost access to fishing grounds. Relocated farmers are given fields near or
overlapping fields of existing communities, causing conflict. Fishermen have
been relocated 10km away from the sea.
Map of LNG
discoveries, where insurgency is gaining momentum
Jihadist insurgents
on Africa’s eastern shores
Societal security
will lead to overall security
It seems
inconceivable that the large energy companies could be so insensitive to the
lives of local people, or offer jobs they knew would not exist or promise
poverty alleviation without any plan. If the companies were relying on
government to use energy industry revenues for anti-poverty and social welfare
programmes, this seems willful naivete given government’s record of corruption
and fiscal responsibility that was uncovered by the International Monetary Fund
at the very time energy companies were making lease deals with government.
However, a hopeful sign has come from government itself. President Filipe Nyusi
has admitted that Ansar al-Sunna is finding support not through religious
conversion or terror but because of “poverty and unemployment.” With the
military proving unable to contain the insurgency, Nyusi has turned to the SADC
for help. At an Extra-Ordinary Summit of the Troika on SADC Organ on Polics,
Defence and Security Cooperation in Harare on 20 May 2020, SADC leaders agreed
that an attack on any member country was an attack on all countries, and condemned
the Cabo Delgao terror attacks. However, no troops were committed, and the
summit concluded with a plan to “study” the situation in Mozambique.
None of this augurs
well for an immediate cessation of insurgent violence. The energy industry’s
short-term business decisions require a stable security situation now. However,
only long-term programmes aimed at ending poverty and inequity will undercut
the advances Ansar al-Sunna has enjoyed in 2020, with the increasing support of
ISIS.
Critical points:
- The Islamic insurgency of
Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province is growing after five years,
threatening the country’s new and promising energy sector
- By failing to fulfil promises to end
poverty and provide jobs, energy companies have worsened social welfare
conditions and have generated support for insurgents
- Government has been unable to mount
an effective counter-insurgency, and military action to achieve security
for the energy sector is insufficient without addressing the fundamental
problem of poverty.
The views expressed are the opinion of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of In On Africa.
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