Fuel price hikes:

 = Petroleum products in Mozambique are, from this Thursday (21-10), 7% to 22% more expensive, reflecting the rise in the price of a barrel of crude, the Energy Regulatory Authority (ARENE) announced on Wednesday.

Cooking gas (LPG) rose 22%, from 58.18 to 71.02 meticais per kilogram.

Diesel, now 7% more expensive, saw the lowest rise – from 57.45 to 61.71 meticais per litre; while gasoline went up 10% from 62.50 to 69.94 meticais per litre.

Paraffin rose by almost 11%, from 43.24 to 47.95 meticais per litre, while compressed natural gas for vehicles (CNG) is up almost 9%, from 30.00 to 32.69 meticais per litre-equivalent.

As usual, ARENE notes that the new prices need not necessarily apply across the whole country, and might be higher at gas stations outside the areas located in by  distribution terminals in Matola, Beira, Nacala and Pemba, since the law makes provision for transport costs. ARENE justifies the price increases with the rise in the price of a barrel of crude on the international market. This situation, according to ARENE, derives from the maintenance of volumes produced by the member countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the lifting of restrictions imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic, which, in many countries, has led to an increase in demand for petroleum products.

The last adjustment of the price of liquid fuels was in November last year, when prices fell.

Petroleum products for sale in Mozambique are imported by sea in special cargo ships, through a process centralised by law in a single public entity, IMOPETRO, which is in turn owned by the petroleum product distributors operating in the country.  It is then up to ARENE to determine the sale price to the public to be practiced throughout Mozambican territory, in accordance with calculations established by law. Yesterday, Brent oil futures increased by 0.89% to US$85.84 per barrel and WTI crude was up 1.29% to US$83.50.

 

 

0.73% in September

 Inflation in Mozambique was 0.73 per cent in September, according to the National Statistics Institute (INE), citing the consumer price indices for the three largest cities (Maputo, Nampula and Beira). Inflation for the first nine months of the year was 3.22 per cent, and annual inflation (1 October 2020 to 30 September 2021) was 6.04 per cent.

The main price increases noted in September were for lemons (up by 76.1 per cent), dried fish (9.4 per cent), coconuts (6.4 per cent), tomatoes (6.3 per cent), restaurant meals (2.5 per cent), and fresh fish (1.7 per cent).

But the prices of some food products fell sharply over the month – peppers (down by 27.5 per cent), garlic (23.7 per cent), lettuce (18 per cent), sweet potatoes (12.2 per cent) and onions (4.7 per cent.

The pattern shown by prices this year is a familiar one. Average prices rose in the first few months of the year, then, as the harvest came in, there was a four month period of deflation. Now prices are rising again, albeit slowly, as the 2021/22 festive season approaches. Inflation was not identical in the three cities. The sharpest price rises were in Nampula, with 1.4 per cent inflation during the month, followed by Maputo with 0.61 per cent, and finally Beira, with just 0.12 per cent.

Hidden debts Trial adjourned for a week

Judge Efigenio Baptista, of the Maputo City Court, on Thursday adjourned for a week the country’s largest ever corruption trial, the case of the “hidden debts”.

He had little choice in the matter. 

On Tuesday he had removed from the case Alexandre Chivale, the lawyer for one of the key accused, Antonio Carlos do Rosario, the former head of economic intelligence in the Mozambican Intelligence and Security Service (SISE), who became chairperson of the three fraudulent companies at the heart of the scandal. Baptista accepted the argument from prosecution attorney Sheila Marrengula that Chivale’s role in SISE placed him in an intractable conflict of interest. Rosario had declared, on 5 October that Chivale “is a SISE collaborator”, something which, at the time, only evoked a smile from the lawyer.

 It was two weeks before Chivale denied Rosario’s claim, and by then it was too late. Both Marrengula and Baptista accepted that Rosario had been telling the truth. This meant that Chivale worked for the state, even if only in an informal role. People who work for the state cannot defend clients in conflict with the state (and in this case the conflict is enormous, since the prosecution is demanding that the 19 defendants in the hidden debts case compensate the state to the tune of over 2.9 billion dollars).

 Rosario has now appointed Isalcio Mahanjane as his new lawyer. Another of Chivale’s clients, Ines Moiane, once the private secretary of former President Armando Guebuza, also asked Mahanjane to represent her, Mahanjane is already one of the lawyers representing Ndambi Guebuza, the oldest son of the former president. On Thursday morning, Mahanjane immediately asked Baptista to grant a five day adjournment,so that he can study the case (even though he should already be very familiar with it, given his work for Ndambi Guebuza). Since it is standard procedure to grant such an adjournment when a suspect changes his lawyer, Baptista adjourned the trial until 28 October.

Mozambique at Dubai Expo

 

On Friday, October 1st – and one year late, due to the Covid-19 pandemic – Expo-2020 Dubai opened to the public. The event, which ends on March 31, 2022, is the first mega-event since the start of the pandemic in early 2020. Expo Dubai brings together, for 182 days, more than 200 participants from 192 countries, including Mozambique, as well as multilateral organizations, companies and educational establishments.Mozambique’s Commissioner-General at Expo 2020 Dubai has been working for nearly two years on the country’s participation in the event. In an interview with ‘Noticias’, Miguel Mkaima said he hoped that Expo Dubai would boost the country’s cultural, social and economic development by attracting new investments.Mozambique takes to Expo-2020 the theme “Respect for Nature, the Best Legacy for Generations to Come”, and the national pavilion is framed in the sub-theme “Sustainability”, whose contents cover matters related to the four priorities of the government: agriculture, infrastructure, energy and tourism. “Our pavilion’s focus is on disseminating the real image of the Mozambican people, their wealth and potential for the environment they have,” said Nkaima

As Expo Dubai is one of the most important world events and an international fair that brings together different sectors, what are Mozambique’s ambitions by participating in it?

“Mozambique’s participation in Expo 2020 Dubai aims to promote and publicise the country’s good image, exchange innovative ideas to face current challenges, ensure the establishment of new partnerships in the economic, social, cultural and technical-scientific areas. We also intend to attract more investments, ensuring the transfer of technology to areas where Mozambique has competitive and comparative advantage, such as agriculture, infrastructure, energy, culture and tourism. Obviously, we will not neglect the need to promote cultural, social, economic, scientific and technological development for the sake of peace, progress and development of humanity.

What is intended then, in practice, is to make Mozambique known to the world?

“Yes. Mozambique will take advantage of the event to make itself known to the world, above all, in its way of thinking and promoting the country’s development. Therefore, the event is an opportunity for us to make new friends, partners, foreign investors. The country invested with everything it has to make its participation in the Expo a success. An event like this entails costs not only for the organizers, but also for the participants. Do you believe that ExpoDubai can bring returns to our country?

“The earnings will be high and we are fully hopeful that Expo participants will welcome Mozambican presentations on issues such as the environment and business opportunities, as well as on investment needs in the areas of agriculture, industry, among others. The benefits of the Expo are not immediate, as universal exhibitions are a platform for exchanging experiences and innovative ideas for the benefit of economic, social, cultural and scientific development aimed at future generations. Returns should be seen as a short, medium and long term. Therefore, returns must match the country’s development plan. We will spread the real, positive image of peace and development in Mozambique to millions of people who will come to our pavilion. The return we aim is for us to be able to attract more investments in the economic, social, cultural and technical-scientific areas. We also intend to establish partnerships and strengthen the bonds of friendship and cooperation between Mozambique and the various countries present at the event.

Showcase the best in the world’s biggest showcase

The General Commissioner of Mozambique at Expo-2020 Dubai, Miguel Mkaima believes that the fact that the country is participating in the universal exhibition allows it to be “in the biggest showcase in the world”, so the delegation’s objective is to reap the greatest possible dividends in the event, exposing its full potential.

What does Mozambique propose to present in this exhibition?

“Mozambique will exhibit the best it has. The focus of the country’s pavilion is the dissemination of the real image of the Mozambican people, their wealth and environmental potential. We intend the pavilion to be interactive, implementing substantive thematic itineraries with a view to providing visitors with virtual and multimedia trips based on new information and communication technologies and with territorial and environmental referencing, highlighting the economic, social, cultural and tourist aspects of our parents. Among the activities to be developed, we highlight the sale of products with an artistic, cultural, touristic or gastronomic impact from Mozambique in our pavilion throughout the six months of the Expo. There will also be a participation of the Mozambican business sector in seminars, debates and colloquiums around the theme of the fair and on business and investment opportunities for the country, in addition to the promotion of artistic and cultural activities within the scope of the National Day of Mozambique at Expo 2020 Dubai.

How will Mozambican business participate in the world mega-event?

“In general, companies carry the largest volume of Mozambican products with an impact on our trade balance. We have long since launched the dissemination of Mozambique’s presence at Expo 2020, at a national level, involving all provinces so that we can ensure greater participation in the event. At the moment, we have about ten government sectors that presented concrete and structural projects to be sold at the Expo, in search of interested investor partners. In general, these are projects in four sectors that we carry out, namely, infrastructure, agriculture, energy and tourism, which are ‘the flag’ of Mozambique. But that is not to say that other sectors are not participating.

What were the selection criteria?

“The sectors that we’re bringing were chosen based on the actions defined by the government as being priorities for the present five-year period: agriculture, infrastructure, energy and tourism. As I mentioned, the central theme of Expo 2020 Dubai is “Connecting Minds, Creating the Future”. This theme also privileges connectivity, partnership and collaboration between nations and international organizations in the search and identification of sustainable solutions to the planet’s global problems. Thus, is an event that aims to boost cultural, social, economic, scientific and technological development for the sake of peace, progress and development of humanity. The theme is structured around three sub-themes, namely, Opportunity, Mobility and Sustainability. The government approved the framing of the Mozambique Pavilion at Expo within the ‘Sustainability’ sub-theme, taking into account that it practically covers matters related to the four priority actions: agriculture, infrastructure, energy and tourism.

Lack of resources limits larger gains

The General Commissioner for Expo Dubai also spoke of the constraints on Mozambique’s participation in this event, considering that this fact will limit the possibility of the country having greater gains in the universal exhibition.

What are the main challenges faced in the process of organising Mozambique’s participation?

“The great constraint is the fact that the country is poor in terms of financial resources. A project to participate in an event like Expo Dubai always brings with it financial needs, because one thing is what we write in our plans and another is its implementation, based on the financial conditions of each participant. I confess that we are not able to financially meet the requirements of all activities during the Expo, which is one of the major constraints. It is in this context that many national participants will pay for their round trip and stay in the UAE. The entire technical team of the Commissariat-General of Mozambique at Expo is already in Dubai.

About Expo 2020 Dubai

Dubai is the largest city and emirate in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a federation of absolute monarchies in the Persian Gulf. Expo 2000 is expected to attract 25 million visitors during the six months it will be open, 70% of whom from outside the UAE, making it the largest expo ever held. The three sub-themes of the event highlight sustainability, pointing, in this context, to sustainable sources of energy and water, since in today’s world, where there is accelerated population growth, innovations aimed at production, supply and energy and water consumption are becoming more and more important. Expo 2020 Dubai will be a platform to put new production models at the service of the flow of financial and intellectual resources, to consolidate the spirit of entrepreneurship and innovation. The exhibition also focuses on the various means of identifying possible partnerships, with the aim of producing a legacy of innovations. The event was initially scheduled for the period October 20, 2020 to April 10, 2021, but due to the Covid-19 pandemic, it was rescheduled for the period from October 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022 , while retaining the name “Expo 2020 Dubai”.

 

Mozambique: Reduction in TB deaths

Mozambique has reduced the number of deaths from tuberculosis, according to the Global Tuberculosis Report 2021, published on Thursday by the World Health Organization (WHO), which places the country among the success stories.

“The success stories include six of the world’s worst-hit nations, Kenya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Vietnam, which have achieved the goal” of reducing the number of deaths by at least 35% between 2015 and 2020. That target was part of the ‘Eliminate Tuberculosis by 2020’ strategy. Obtaining reliable data on the disease is difficult, so the WHO’s annual reports are based on best estimates given the ranges of data collected, which can be pretty broad.

The organisation estimates that 12,400 people died of tuberculosis in Mozambique in 2020 (about half associated with HIV), while five years earlier, those estimates showed that the total number of deaths per year could reach 55,000 – the reduction in deaths from the disease could be as much as 77% since then. In other words, WHO today points to a current death rate of 11% among the estimated 115,000 cases in the country in 2020 for a universe of 31 million inhabitants – a prevalence of 368 cases per 100,000 inhabitants.

“Globally, the cumulative reduction in tuberculosis incidence rate from 2015 to 2020 was 11%, just over half of what the 2020 milestone was,” the document noted.

“Six countries – India, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia – collectively accounted for 74% of patients who started treatment in 2020,” the organisation adds.

The WHO has three lists of countries most affected and requiring the most attention for 2021-25: a list with those with more TB, others with more HIV-associated TB, and those with more drug-resistant TB. Mozambique is on all three lists, as are nine other countries: China, Democratic Republic of Congo, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa and Zambia.

• You may read, download the full Global Tuberculosis Report 2021 HERE.

Tony Blair

Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair has warned developed countries that they risk condemning countries like Mozambique to poverty if they cut funding to all fossil fuel exploitation projects because of environmental concerns. In a foreword to a report entitled “A Just Transition for Africa: Championing a Fair and Prosperous Pathway to Net Zero“, Blair warned of the consequences of ending funding for energy produced from natural gas.   If high-income countries (HICs)” attempt to limit development opportunities – for example, by ceasing funding for energy generated by gas, without making provisions for equally affordable alternatives – they risk condemning countries to continuing poverty and food insecurity. ”An unintended effect could be African countries resorting to funding from “alternative finance partners, who could turn a blind eye to damaging environmental impacts.”

” Global climate action and the approach to net zero in Africa often fail to take into account the urgent need to develop and industrialise across much of the continent.,” he laments.

Blair argues that HICs  should not only take on the lion’s share of greenhouse gas reductions to combat global warming, but also significantly increase funding associated with adapting and protecting developing countries from the impact of climate change. Mozambique is highlighted in the study published on Thursday by the Tony Blair Institute for World Transformation as a flagship case, as the natural gas reserves in the north of the country represent potential for the country’s economic and social development. While some of the natural gas extracted, which is not expected to happen until 2026, will be destined for domestic consumption, they note, most of it will be exported and will help other countries rely less on more polluting energy sources such as coal and oil.

“Harnessing the transformative power of gas is a development imperative that serves people, prosperity and the planet, while recognising the legitimate aspirations of Mozambicans”. The report is published less than a month before the COP26 climate conference in Glasgow between 31 October and 12 November. The conference will seek to put into practice the commitments of the Paris Agreement, reached in 2015, to limit global warming below two degrees Celsius, preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius. More than 120 world leaders are expected at a high-level meeting in the early days of COP26, which is expected to bring together some 25,000 participants, including politicians, activists, experts and national negotiators.

You may read, download the full Tony Blair Institute report”A Just Transition for Africa: Championing a Fair and Prosperous Pathway to Net Zero”  HERE

 

Beluluane Industrial Park

Beluluane National Park (BIP) has changed its name to MozParks Holding- Parques Industriais e Zonas Francas, SA. The decision, first considered at management level, was consolidated after a working visit to the park by Minister of Industry and Commerce Carlos Alberto Mesquita, who suggested the creation of a chain of industrial parks under the PRONAI programme, as a way of boosting industrial development in the country. The General Director of the now MozParks, Onório Boane, said in an interview with Voz do Empresário that, in order to replicate the Beluluane Industrial Park (BIP) model throughout the country, it was decided to create a holding company as a way to standardise the management of industrial parks and match BIP’s success.

“In this exercise, the first thing that changed was, of course, our identity. We will have the Beluluane Industrial Park not as our identity, but simply as a park, because our vision is that the industrial parks in each province be named after the place where they are located. This is an issue linked to valuing local content,” Boane explained. “It will be like that at the Topuíto Industrial Park, which will effectively be our first experience outside Maputo. The park is located in the district of Larde, formerly known as Moma, in Nampula province, around the Kenmare heavy sands project,” he continued. Onório Boane says that, similarly to BIP, which was created to support the Mozal megaproject, the Topuíto Industrial Park will, in its first phase, serve the needs of Kenmare, as a heavy sands exploiter. “We want to ensure that we create conditions around Kenmare to house industrial and service provider companies as a way of promoting local content and reducing imports, given that, around megaprojects which do not have an industrial park, most components and other equipment is imported,” he said.

Meanwhile, diversification in these parks will take place over the years, as companies master their business models, Onório pointed out. “That’s how it happened in BIP. From 2000, when we started operations, until 2005, 100% of the companies headquartered there provided services to Mozal. From 2006 to now, I can categorically state that only 30% serve Mozal. We inverted the graph. It means that 70% feeds the provincial market, nationally and internationally, through exports,” Boane declared. Based on the experience with Mozal, which, despite diversification, maintained its share of companies headquartered in the park, the plan is to create a range of opportunities to benefit the economy as a whole.

 

 Beluluane Industrial Park, Maputo province. [Photo courtesy: MozParks]“The diversification in BIP actually grew in a quite larger proportion compared to the companies that provide services to the megaproject. Although our approach is aimed at installing the industrial park in the context of anchor projects, at BIP we now have hair, food processing and cashew nut companies, along with construction material and cement companies, among others. Larde it will be like that, too. Initially, it will be focussed around Kenmare, but there are many opportunities in Nampula province in the various districts,” he asserts.

MozParks project dimension and progress

As part of the expansion of the industrial parks, MozParks plans to develop a total of 1,000 hectares in each province, and the feasibility study in Larde has already been completed. This feasibility study, Onório Manuel says, was critical in making the investment decision. It was positive, which allowed for the next phase – of articulation with local entities – to prepare the areas to be explored. “In the first phase of Topuíto industrial park, we hope to see 215 hectares developed. This October, we will start a pre-phase that will consist of installing all the infrastructure in the 15 hectares which will house the first companies. “We are in the initial phase of the works at the site, which was preceded by the entire administrative process that we now consider concluded. Only the implementation of the aforementioned infrastructures on the ground remains to be finished,” he clarified. Onório Boane revealed that MozParks’ second industrial park will be in Cabo Delgado, specifically in Montepuez district, where it is intended to install an agro-park, with a strong focus on promoting access to the market.

The director-general of MozParks says that the company wants to take the greatest possible advantage of the lessons of the Covid-19 pandemic and increasingly promote self-sufficiency in the national industry. “Throughout this year (2021), we managed to consolidate and show resilience in the face of a world-wide crisis. The companies in the park were able to produce what Mozal imported before the pandemic. In other words, the pandemic challenged the park’s companies to produce various types of equipment, and many engineering and metalworking companies did so with great success, which shows that in the face of crises, the park is able to respond,” Boane concluded.

The securitisation of capitalist rule in Africa

In March 2021, the international press was flush with coverage of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al Jamma’ah (ASWJ) after members of the group had undertaken a limited offensive in northern Mozambique. Coded as Islamist militants, about 200 rebels had captured the town of Palma, an economic hub for Total’s gas operations in the Afungi Peninsula, the site of Africa’s second largest gas reserve. Shortly thereafter, Total evacuated its complex, abandoned equipment and suspended plans to develop a US$20bn gas liquefaction plant. According to some estimates, 3,100 people have been killed and 820,000 displaced. Notwithstanding SADC’s mixed record of regional intervention, subsequently there were calls for their involvement, even suggestions of committing  military assets using the familiar rhetoric of ‘responsibility to protect’. In late June SADC approved a standby force, if needed. Still, the regional politics is fraught as SADC’s involvement could erode the legitimacy of the state more than that of the rebels 2000km away. Seemingly, the preference is for targeted military assistance from the US and EU. Indeed in December the previous year, EU parliamentarian Michael Gahler warned “the United States is trying to involve Mozambique in its anti-IS coalition.”

While there is debate whether ASWJ have a relationship with the Islamic State, the US Department of State has nevertheless labeled the group as ISIS-Mozambique. Such a framing is indicative of how counter-insurgency epistemologies perpetuate the conflicts in which they are applied. While it is not impossible that ASWJ may draw inspiration from conflicts abroad in the North Africa or Middle East, there are nevertheless many local drivers of the conflict, with resentment at economic marginalization of rural populations being a significant factor, especially in the wake of Cyclone Kenneth in 2019 and COVID-19 pandemic that started in 2020. A counter-insurgency approach will do little to address the foundational grievances of economic exclusion, poverty, and inequality; but it does reiterate that securitization of capital is an imperative.

Without more attention to these local factors, much of the South African and international media analysis “falls short of levels of precision” needed to account for the various layers of inequalities and resource conflicts that certainly predate Total’s enclave extractivism, but which Total’s arrival amplified. These key factors underscore the findings by Michael Watts, Ike Okonta, Dimieari Von Kemedi and their many collaborators in their decades long study of the political ecology of oil in the Niger delta and the rebellions spawned by the presence of multinational companies facilitated by governments which at best were fairly distant to ordinary people, but more typically pursued interests that were hostile to local populations. So instead of the partial frame of counter-terrorism advanced by SADC and the US government, well contextualised media reporting might improve the public understanding of the situation in Mozambique through framing it as, amongst others, the long-standing economic neglect of rural citizenry by central governments compounded by capitalist penetration of the extreme periphery. Among other factors, this penetration causes impoverishment through the destruction of livelihoods, like fishing communities in the Cabo Delgado province tapped for forced resettlement to make way for Total’s construction. But this sort of broader line of enquiry/explanation is complicated and harder to investigate because for example reporters visiting Mozambique’s north require the cooperation and protection of a media-hostile state and of local power brokers, including foreign armies. Altogether the reality of these working conditions narrows the prospect for holistic reporting, especially for journalists stationed in the region who have to have repeated encounters with state officials for other reporting.

One subtext in the subsequent regional and international press reports expressed astonishment at how Islamic fundamentalists had besieged the supposedly well-guarded oil complex, a symbol of capitalist ambition and power. Composed of global capital driving foreign direct investment and the local Mozambique political class, this complex’s anticipated operations in the Afungi Peninsula was positioned as a potent expression of the Africa Rising narrative. The project was not supposed to be attacked, let alone be abandoned due to a relatively minor rural rebellion so in effect the event exposed how the various weaknesses in the Mozambican state meant it was ill-equipped to secure capital on this occasion. Quickly questions were being asked. How and why had security forces failed to contain the attack? What kind of local group wished to eject businesses that could bring prosperity to their region? What is their plan, their agenda? Capital seldom experiences ambushes and defeats on this scale by opponents like these, in such dramatic fashion in front of the cameras, in this corner of Africa or in fact anywhere else on the globe. The question is now what kind of actions do states like Mozambique and others that face similar opponents take to secure a favorable business climate and preemptively contain threats against capital, or at least ensure they do not attract headlines and media attention that jeopardize share prices and major business plans. 

While having important differences and proximate explanations, there are two other recent events that also speak to the evolving relationship between capital, the state, and securitization. The first, in June 2021 was an assassination attempt on General Wamala, a core member of Uganda’s National Resistance Movement government. The attack occurred outside his home, in a residential area of Kampala, by assassins on motorbikes. Wamala’s daughter and driver were killed. The events were captured on CCTV and shared by the state with the general public. Uganda has in the past few years witnessed a string of highly controversial and publicly debated high profile murders that included representatives of the state, parliament, and the Muslim community among the killed. Similarly, in July 2021 images of the storming of commercial centres and looting of shopping centres in South Africa invoked the need for greater institutional security, despite prominent warnings of an emerging South African security state. Again, there are unique contextual factors, but both cited events in Uganda and South Africa, were embarrassing, temporary defeats of already highly guarded, securitised socio-political orders. Accordingly, might the state and capital insist upon more CCTV, more security forces, and more classified budgets to deliver on the promise of security in insecure times?

Already there are signs of an escalation in securitization. In Uganda, the government spent US$126 million to purchase a 3,200 camera CCTV system from Huawei for Kampala. Nominally, this system is in response to a violent crime wave, the system forms part of Huawei’s Safe City initiative, which has been rolled out in more than 200 cities worldwide. Following cities like London which pioneered the introduction of mass CCTV systems in mid-1990s after the 1993 Bishopsgate bombing, this initiative has seen Chinese cities become some of the most-surveilled urban areas in the world (there are 2.6 million cameras in a city like Chongqing, Sichuan providing 168 cameras per 1,000 people). While citizens have a right to safety – and there are moral panics generated by a  surveillance culture especially in the West when Chinese companies are involved – arguably the deeper reason for this procurement is the securitization of capital and of capitalist class rule. After the latest attack on the minister, President Museveni announced plans to put a tracking system in every vehicle; in this case with the help of a Russian company. While politicians and activists have pushed back on these plans, these latest developments are consistent with the evolving character of neoliberal capitalism in Uganda and elsewhere in Africa.

There is a larger context to the coarticulation of massive wealth accumulation borne from capitalism and the militarised political economy which helps secure it. Uganda was regarded as emblematic of the dividends from adopting the neoliberal reform package. These reforms produced a restructuring in the late 1980s onwards as the National Resistance Movement came to power following the civil war. Beginning as a rebel movement formed to oppose authoritarian governments, the NRM and Yoweri Museveni’s government has been in power for more than 35 years. Through becoming the kind of polity they replaced, the NRM is intensifying surveillance practices to preserve aspects of ‘no-party democracy’ including controlling consent and dissent. The result is arguably a form of transactional citizenship for sections of society. Provided citizens do not aid political opponents, they will be kept safe. This exchange is offered in context of highly neoliberalised society where, as Achille Mbembe writes, the “privatization of public violence, the appropriation of means of livelihood, and the imaginations of the self” characterise everyday life.

As earlier neoliberal reforms set in motion changes in the order of Uganda, so it is probable that neoliberal securitization in the 2020s in tandem with discourses of national development will further shift what political actions are regarded as acceptable/unacceptable and whose views are subsequently coded against the axes of good/bad, legitimate/illegitimate, and right/wrong. If that is the case then the new surveillance system will prompt a revisiting of the classic question of “who is to be protected, by whom, against what and whom, and at what price?”, as Mbembe writes.

Returning to Mozambique’s north, the coincidence of the state’s embrace of enclave extractivism and retrenchment from governance in the north, has come at a high cost to residents already pressured by decades of underdevelopment and some of the most devastating climate change impacts on the planet. Humanitarian development aid to parts of Cabo Delgado has been stopped by the provincial government due to insurgent activity. Indeed, Joseph Hanlon, whose newsletter suggests deliberation in the displacement of local populations by insurgents, mercenaries, and the government, with each having something to gain. But this mediation would take place in a climate where some African states are keen to embrace foreign military intervention and more hi-tech militarised surveillance systems in accordance with modernist developmental models. While the details of each case matter considerably, there are some general conclusions to be drawn. First, making security enclaves will reshape the political space regardless of whether they are in urban or rural areas. Second, any restructuring is a conflict-ridden process with political outcomes rarely known beforehand. While these matters can still be contested, in the interim demilitarisation does not seem to be on the agenda because the institutionalisation of patterns around militarised ‘solutions’ and escalating foreign militarization with state and private variants providing further evidence of a colonial present consistent with the long history of violent capitalist accumulation on the continent.

By Scott Timcke, Jörg Wiegratz, and Chris Paterson