I was recently in Quelimane, among other things, share
ideas around our political and military crisis. I will not summarize what you
said, but I will share the center lines of what I think are the biggest
obstacles to peace and gravitate all around the inability of the actors
involved to overcome their own addictions, limitations and prejudices about the
country and about its responsibility for the preservation of peace and the
exhaustion of the current model of political relations.
To begin, I would like to remind everyone that
Mozambique live the same problems since he is known as a multi-party democracy.
The post-electoral conflicts are a constant since 1994 and which was lived
since then was always the same thing: elections / allegations of fraud / non-recognition
of the results / events / deaths / conflict management / elections / boycotts
Renamo / elections . Parallel to this, the armed men were always newspapers
covers the subject in election and post-election.
There is absolutely nothing new that we have not seen
or heard since the days of President Joaquim Chissano. Subsequent negotiations
elections served or to update the electoral law or to accommodate some demands
of Renamo. And with each new accommodation or legislative review arose new
problems. And so we were living the armed peace. In all the demonstrations that
took place, people died. In 2012, at the height of political repression imposed
by the government of Armando Guebuza to critics and opposition members, Afonso
Dhlakama refuge to Gorongosa where reactive their military forces. As a result,
he broke the little war whose theoretical order became known through the
agreements of 5 September 2014. Recently, after the 2014 elections, the climate
of tension rekindled behold again Afonso Dhlakama is systematically pursued
with a result suffered several attacks, including his closest.
For rational organizations, who think towards a common
good and have a winning plan, it would be time to stop and reflect on ways to
fight that in 20 years did not result in anything but in deaths, delays and
destruction; stagnation and bad name internationally.
• Why they insist on methods that do not work?
• Twenty years are not enough to convince themselves
that the methods used so far to resolve the conflict do not work?
The insistence of the same methods suggests one of two
or three conclusions:
• Or someone is taking benefit of this racket
• Or we face the inability to make deep readings on
the real causes of the conflict
• That we are dealing with an elite that still did not
realize that their thinking is flawed and the alternatives they propose are not
feasible.
Indeed, we are dealing with two entities that nourish
a "love" for each other visceral make 40 years. And their
relationship has not changed since then: mutual mistrust, lack of transparency,
perennial attempt to betray the agreed and whenever the opportunity allows,
ambushes political or military. It was ever thus, on both sides.
Then I will mention four basic problems which, from my
point of view, FRELIMO could not solve the last 40 years. And then mention the
other four main challenges to overcome Renamo.
FIRST: Contrary to the propaganda of Frelimo noises,
we live a divided country: both ethnically and economically and politically. To
this national unity is a fallacy. One of the problems that Frelimo could never
solve was the promotion of national unity. Like yesterday, today people think
that regional disparities are not being duly and demonstrably addressed; Afonso
Dhlakama and Renamo speak at ease in being able to divide the country or govern
where he won or even form a center of the Republic and Northern Mozambique
without causing riot or public reprimand by the Mozambicans, especially the
regions concerned. As much as you try to prove the opposite, in fact a united
people will never allow such pronouncements and even the perpetrators of such
pronouncements would never dare to manipulate the regionalist sentiment in its
favor. If they do it is because they are aware that most of these people share
the same feeling, whether this be right or wrong. In fact, this is a problem
that comes from the formation of the Liberation Front Frelimo, characterized by
internal tribal conflicts; the massacres promoted against leaders seen as
opposition by the victorious factions, persecution and eccentric leaders. The
fact that we won the independence of the Portuguese is not proof that it was
the result of national unity. And the fact that we continue now as a country is
not only because the Frelimo Party worked or work for it. As Professor Elisio
Macamo one day said, Mozambique is a geographical and historical accident and I
add; born of a colonial project which herdamo it as it is. This point brings me
to the second challenge.
SECOND: The organization of political power is a
producer of exclusion and marginalization: the transition from a single party
system to multiparty was not accompanied by necessary reforms to ensure that
every Mozambican, each organization gain; live according to their performance.
My point here is that the way we are politically and administratively organized
does not allow each and every one of us "live your expense."
• We vote in person only to the position of President
of the Republic which is then responsible for appointing more than 100 national
and provincial leaders, among governors, ministers and deputy ministers
(exacerbated powers)
• Although we have the provincial assemblies, the
governors are authentic "impostors", sent from PR who run according
to their will. The this anthropological implication is that despite being
formally leaders, hardly these are legitimate or legitimized, particularly in
regions where the provincial director does not correspond to what was the
choice from the same people. Therefore, the governors should be elected to
complete the costume of the Provincial Assembly.
Coupled with the point raised earlier, Afonso Dhlakama
operates very successfully this when now for example, we have a month to
testify if indeed threats materialize or not.
In Mozambique or you win everything or lose
everything. there is no middle ground. I know of no stable democracy that
shares the same electoral system that our uum or similar
political-administrative system. And before dubious electoral management
bodies, it is impossible for them immediately targeted actors not insurjam. The
electoral defeat means automatic exclusion both economically and politically
and permanent convício with despair and uncertainty. Our electoral system
instead of contributing to political rapprochement and consolidation of
democracy, weakened by the contrary.
Third: 50% of national wealth is spent by the state
and its employees with the head of a cartel ruling elite. Related to the two
preceding paragraphs, the national wealth is consumed almost entirely by the
state of servers, which constitutes the minority of the working population of
the country, with the cartel's elite head. If we look at the budget we find
that 60% of this goes to operating expenses and the rest 40% for investment.
This means that for most people, just comes to them what is possible and lucky.
In the current political conditions, this means that unless the opposition
parties control municipalities or provinces, hardly they can reproduce
themselves, let alone their members can access the table of business or the
state apparatus.
the draft law presented by both Renamo and the MDM,
show how urgent despartidarizar state institutions. However, even if this
happens, without a thorough reform of the administration of the state and
constitution, such proposals would be difficult to implement. What the
opposition parties need not laws that despartidarizem the state, but conditions
that allow access to power proportional to their performance and policy
relevance.
ROOM: Inability to strengthen institutions able to
solve the driving reasons for conflicts. Although Mozambique is a multiparty
democracy, state sovereignty to institutions too can hardly perform in full
their functions. Take for example the parliament, which in principle should be
the watchdog of the state. However, Partisanship prevents this is reality. We
have seen repeatedly by the uncritical alignment of the majority counter to the
dictates of the government while the minority celebrate the chorus of sameness.
Twenty years after the then warring parties continue to behave as if they had
just met, repeating the same fears, the same vices and prejudices, the same
buzzwords disqualifying; the same initial positions.
While it is in the interest of Frelimo continue to
rule the coming years, will itself be the trigger clearly identified processes
of change in the previous four points. If you do not want; if you want to
experience the opposition, as it has done all over Mozambique, you can still
entrenched in their prejudices, celebrating the groupthink.
On the other hand, Renamo also has its challenges,
which need to be overcome them and most importantly, the military question.
FIRST: Gunmen. In theory, it is very difficult to
disarm a soldier. Much more difficult is to disarm your mind. For the military,
the weapon is their security. Regarding Renamo and its leadership, I notice a
certain at ease in maintaining their armed men as well, they think it is easier
to strengthen its bargaining position at the negotiating table with Frelimo.
Well, on the one hand it is true that Frelimo gave certain requirements due to
this real risk, on the other, are precisely the weapons the cause of these
endless cycles of post-election violence, which extend throughout the cycle.
Before this, keep gunmen represents an unnecessary cost and a significant
burden on the finances of Renamo.
If we look closely, we see that the last twenty years,
weapons were only able to protect Afonso Dhlakama, leader of Renamo. AND NO ONE
ELSE.
• Weapons failed to protect Gilles Cistac;
• failed to protect Manuel Bissopo,
• failed to protect supporters of Renamo in Montepuez,
Mogincual or Angoche;
• failed to protect the guard SG Renamo;
• weapons failed to protect the arrest of Mr Muchanga
or Brigadier Chilli;
• weapons failed to protect the numerous members of
Renamo and MDM and other innocent civilians abducted and killed by politically
motivated.
The only concrete evidence we have regarding the
usefulness of Renamo weapons is that they managed to protect yes Renamo leader.
As a person and as a human, it would be time to consider whether it is worth
continuing with the same vision, the same policy, twenty years later, exposing
their sympathizers and supporters to direct more likely to die shot.
It is SIM TRUTH that there are people willing to die
for the leader. But the best would be that these people lived to see their
leader ascend to the position of President of the Republic; enjoy the sacrifice
of income and realize the alternation of power; see the country develop.
Therefore, it is also a leader's responsibility to save lives, save lives,
protect their members.
If we die, we can not benefit from his leadership,
when this finally came to power. Beyond parity, integration or reform criteria,
I think there should be before the Renamo, a resolute decision to get rid of
the gunmen.
Disarm has an advantage that curiously Renamo may be
wasting. It is that guns are a limiting instrument to the public commitment of
all Renamo supporters. I will try to say it in other words: When the Renamo
introduces the discourse of weapons, limits or silences a huge fringe of his
supporters and limits them from the possibility of being able to engage in the
practice. This happens not only because people do not want war but also because
the overwhelming majority or nearly all voters have no weapons. Moreover,
civilians are afraid of being identified as belonging to the agitators. In fact
only the soldiers is that they can shoot.
• The greatest wealth Renamo are not weapons. Are free
people, who want to support their leader and the party to win the elections
otherwise; otherwise. But with weapons, these people find themselves hindered
in participating.
• A Renamo no weapons will be much more successful,
more powerful, more influential, more ready to rule because it will have direct
and uninhibited support of the people, willing to organize themselves to take
power. It is this point that I will speak next.
SECOND Organization to win the elections. I do not
know if would be left margin for doubt is claimed that the last ten years
Renamo spent more time "running away" from which to plan their
political work. Since the transfer of residence of their leader from Maputo to
Nampula and from there to Santungira; of Santungira to Beira and again to the
uncertain / secure part, the leadership of Renamo lost a lot of time, resources
and intelligence in search of survival than the political organization and its
bases. This is not to align the pitch of the President Nyusi whose
pronouncements made in Addis Ababa were clearly unhappy, but I want to reaffirm
that in the last election claims experience has shown that Renamo did not score
any points in this chapter. Gaza never elected whether a deputy. In fact, Gaza
has been a real no-go zone for Renamo and it nor cares to become established
there. Election violence claims may make sense but the risk of continuing to
lose will be greater if the organizational work does not start early and
persistently.
In Inhambane, electoral results point to higher
turnout the polls ever, hovering between 80-90% in favor of the ruling party;
atypical thing for the standard of participation, which does not exceed 50%.
Why does it happen? Lack of tax, absence of representatives, lack of political
work by Renamo. However much we blame the government for fraud or do nothing to
stop the election violence; or the electoral management bodies to be permissive
fraud is especially Renamo that falls the responsibility to organize the best
way to change the disadvantage. Indeed, the southern part is that in fact gives
victory to Frelimo, since the clearance system is the sum of valid votes.
THIRD: Leadership: lead the opposition opinion and the
masses. Because of items 1 and 2 above, although Renamo continue to have
greater acceptance across the country, it is curiously disengaged a party of
the masses. As the largest party in opposition, she had an obligation to lead
the opposition opinion. What we see is oddly one Babylonian where even the
ruling party joins some opposition parties whenever it likes, manipulating them
in prejudice to the opposition. Rethink the Renamo leadership role will involve
taking its role as leader of the opposition opinion. And that Renamo know
perfectly how to do and what to do.
ROOM: Courage to be the first to change. The Renamo
leader and the people are aware of the "evil government of Frelimo".
There is not the slightest doubt. However, not enough to know this. And be
limited to detailing the evil of the enemy is not to make good policy. The only
alternative left for Renamo, if you want to come forward, is to have the
courage to change. Changing, surprising the opponent to take the necessary
advantages, can leave a choked Frelimo, then this time going through one of its
worst internal crisis after the death of Eduardo Mondlane in 1969! But this
requires courage; courage to proceed with a new and renewing politics,
inspiring the masses; courage to assume its role as leader of the opposition
opinion; NEW THINGS TO DO courage. I said, DO THINGS OF COURAGE BRIDES and differently
Both Frelimo and Renamo, the secret lies in being the
first to come forward in changing the way of doing politics, including
concessions that the game may seem exaggerated. Gone are the times when it was
favored ZERO SUM game theories. Now all should strive for the scenario WIN-WIN.
Accept losing to earn a little together consolidate peace.
It's possible.
(EGIDIO VAZ/historian)
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