Friday, February 5, 2016

The third route

I was recently in Quelimane, among other things, share ideas around our political and military crisis. I will not summarize what you said, but I will share the center lines of what I think are the biggest obstacles to peace and gravitate all around the inability of the actors involved to overcome their own addictions, limitations and prejudices about the country and about its responsibility for the preservation of peace and the exhaustion of the current model of political relations.
To begin, I would like to remind everyone that Mozambique live the same problems since he is known as a multi-party democracy. The post-electoral conflicts are a constant since 1994 and which was lived since then was always the same thing: elections / allegations of fraud / non-recognition of the results / events / deaths / conflict management / elections / boycotts Renamo / elections . Parallel to this, the armed men were always newspapers covers the subject in election and post-election.
There is absolutely nothing new that we have not seen or heard since the days of President Joaquim Chissano. Subsequent negotiations elections served or to update the electoral law or to accommodate some demands of Renamo. And with each new accommodation or legislative review arose new problems. And so we were living the armed peace. In all the demonstrations that took place, people died. In 2012, at the height of political repression imposed by the government of Armando Guebuza to critics and opposition members, Afonso Dhlakama refuge to Gorongosa where reactive their military forces. As a result, he broke the little war whose theoretical order became known through the agreements of 5 September 2014. Recently, after the 2014 elections, the climate of tension rekindled behold again Afonso Dhlakama is systematically pursued with a result suffered several attacks, including his closest.
For rational organizations, who think towards a common good and have a winning plan, it would be time to stop and reflect on ways to fight that in 20 years did not result in anything but in deaths, delays and destruction; stagnation and bad name internationally.
• Why they insist on methods that do not work?
• Twenty years are not enough to convince themselves that the methods used so far to resolve the conflict do not work?
The insistence of the same methods suggests one of two or three conclusions:
• Or someone is taking benefit of this racket
• Or we face the inability to make deep readings on the real causes of the conflict
• That we are dealing with an elite that still did not realize that their thinking is flawed and the alternatives they propose are not feasible.
Indeed, we are dealing with two entities that nourish a "love" for each other visceral make 40 years. And their relationship has not changed since then: mutual mistrust, lack of transparency, perennial attempt to betray the agreed and whenever the opportunity allows, ambushes political or military. It was ever thus, on both sides.

Then I will mention four basic problems which, from my point of view, FRELIMO could not solve the last 40 years. And then mention the other four main challenges to overcome Renamo.
FIRST: Contrary to the propaganda of Frelimo noises, we live a divided country: both ethnically and economically and politically. To this national unity is a fallacy. One of the problems that Frelimo could never solve was the promotion of national unity. Like yesterday, today people think that regional disparities are not being duly and demonstrably addressed; Afonso Dhlakama and Renamo speak at ease in being able to divide the country or govern where he won or even form a center of the Republic and Northern Mozambique without causing riot or public reprimand by the Mozambicans, especially the regions concerned. As much as you try to prove the opposite, in fact a united people will never allow such pronouncements and even the perpetrators of such pronouncements would never dare to manipulate the regionalist sentiment in its favor. If they do it is because they are aware that most of these people share the same feeling, whether this be right or wrong. In fact, this is a problem that comes from the formation of the Liberation Front Frelimo, characterized by internal tribal conflicts; the massacres promoted against leaders seen as opposition by the victorious factions, persecution and eccentric leaders. The fact that we won the independence of the Portuguese is not proof that it was the result of national unity. And the fact that we continue now as a country is not only because the Frelimo Party worked or work for it. As Professor Elisio Macamo one day said, Mozambique is a geographical and historical accident and I add; born of a colonial project which herdamo it as it is. This point brings me to the second challenge.
SECOND: The organization of political power is a producer of exclusion and marginalization: the transition from a single party system to multiparty was not accompanied by necessary reforms to ensure that every Mozambican, each organization gain; live according to their performance. My point here is that the way we are politically and administratively organized does not allow each and every one of us "live your expense."
• We vote in person only to the position of President of the Republic which is then responsible for appointing more than 100 national and provincial leaders, among governors, ministers and deputy ministers (exacerbated powers)
• Although we have the provincial assemblies, the governors are authentic "impostors", sent from PR who run according to their will. The this anthropological implication is that despite being formally leaders, hardly these are legitimate or legitimized, particularly in regions where the provincial director does not correspond to what was the choice from the same people. Therefore, the governors should be elected to complete the costume of the Provincial Assembly.
Coupled with the point raised earlier, Afonso Dhlakama operates very successfully this when now for example, we have a month to testify if indeed threats materialize or not.
In Mozambique or you win everything or lose everything. there is no middle ground. I know of no stable democracy that shares the same electoral system that our uum or similar political-administrative system. And before dubious electoral management bodies, it is impossible for them immediately targeted actors not insurjam. The electoral defeat means automatic exclusion both economically and politically and permanent convício with despair and uncertainty. Our electoral system instead of contributing to political rapprochement and consolidation of democracy, weakened by the contrary.
Third: 50% of national wealth is spent by the state and its employees with the head of a cartel ruling elite. Related to the two preceding paragraphs, the national wealth is consumed almost entirely by the state of servers, which constitutes the minority of the working population of the country, with the cartel's elite head. If we look at the budget we find that 60% of this goes to operating expenses and the rest 40% for investment. This means that for most people, just comes to them what is possible and lucky. In the current political conditions, this means that unless the opposition parties control municipalities or provinces, hardly they can reproduce themselves, let alone their members can access the table of business or the state apparatus.
the draft law presented by both Renamo and the MDM, show how urgent despartidarizar state institutions. However, even if this happens, without a thorough reform of the administration of the state and constitution, such proposals would be difficult to implement. What the opposition parties need not laws that despartidarizem the state, but conditions that allow access to power proportional to their performance and policy relevance.
ROOM: Inability to strengthen institutions able to solve the driving reasons for conflicts. Although Mozambique is a multiparty democracy, state sovereignty to institutions too can hardly perform in full their functions. Take for example the parliament, which in principle should be the watchdog of the state. However, Partisanship prevents this is reality. We have seen repeatedly by the uncritical alignment of the majority counter to the dictates of the government while the minority celebrate the chorus of sameness. Twenty years after the then warring parties continue to behave as if they had just met, repeating the same fears, the same vices and prejudices, the same buzzwords disqualifying; the same initial positions.
While it is in the interest of Frelimo continue to rule the coming years, will itself be the trigger clearly identified processes of change in the previous four points. If you do not want; if you want to experience the opposition, as it has done all over Mozambique, you can still entrenched in their prejudices, celebrating the groupthink.

On the other hand, Renamo also has its challenges, which need to be overcome them and most importantly, the military question.
FIRST: Gunmen. In theory, it is very difficult to disarm a soldier. Much more difficult is to disarm your mind. For the military, the weapon is their security. Regarding Renamo and its leadership, I notice a certain at ease in maintaining their armed men as well, they think it is easier to strengthen its bargaining position at the negotiating table with Frelimo. Well, on the one hand it is true that Frelimo gave certain requirements due to this real risk, on the other, are precisely the weapons the cause of these endless cycles of post-election violence, which extend throughout the cycle. Before this, keep gunmen represents an unnecessary cost and a significant burden on the finances of Renamo.
If we look closely, we see that the last twenty years, weapons were only able to protect Afonso Dhlakama, leader of Renamo. AND NO ONE ELSE.
• Weapons failed to protect Gilles Cistac;
• failed to protect Manuel Bissopo,
• failed to protect supporters of Renamo in Montepuez, Mogincual or Angoche;
• failed to protect the guard SG Renamo;
• weapons failed to protect the arrest of Mr Muchanga or Brigadier Chilli;
• weapons failed to protect the numerous members of Renamo and MDM and other innocent civilians abducted and killed by politically motivated.
The only concrete evidence we have regarding the usefulness of Renamo weapons is that they managed to protect yes Renamo leader. As a person and as a human, it would be time to consider whether it is worth continuing with the same vision, the same policy, twenty years later, exposing their sympathizers and supporters to direct more likely to die shot.
It is SIM TRUTH that there are people willing to die for the leader. But the best would be that these people lived to see their leader ascend to the position of President of the Republic; enjoy the sacrifice of income and realize the alternation of power; see the country develop. Therefore, it is also a leader's responsibility to save lives, save lives, protect their members.
If we die, we can not benefit from his leadership, when this finally came to power. Beyond parity, integration or reform criteria, I think there should be before the Renamo, a resolute decision to get rid of the gunmen.
Disarm has an advantage that curiously Renamo may be wasting. It is that guns are a limiting instrument to the public commitment of all Renamo supporters. I will try to say it in other words: When the Renamo introduces the discourse of weapons, limits or silences a huge fringe of his supporters and limits them from the possibility of being able to engage in the practice. This happens not only because people do not want war but also because the overwhelming majority or nearly all voters have no weapons. Moreover, civilians are afraid of being identified as belonging to the agitators. In fact only the soldiers is that they can shoot.
• The greatest wealth Renamo are not weapons. Are free people, who want to support their leader and the party to win the elections otherwise; otherwise. But with weapons, these people find themselves hindered in participating.
• A Renamo no weapons will be much more successful, more powerful, more influential, more ready to rule because it will have direct and uninhibited support of the people, willing to organize themselves to take power. It is this point that I will speak next.
SECOND Organization to win the elections. I do not know if would be left margin for doubt is claimed that the last ten years Renamo spent more time "running away" from which to plan their political work. Since the transfer of residence of their leader from Maputo to Nampula and from there to Santungira; of Santungira to Beira and again to the uncertain / secure part, the leadership of Renamo lost a lot of time, resources and intelligence in search of survival than the political organization and its bases. This is not to align the pitch of the President Nyusi whose pronouncements made in Addis Ababa were clearly unhappy, but I want to reaffirm that in the last election claims experience has shown that Renamo did not score any points in this chapter. Gaza never elected whether a deputy. In fact, Gaza has been a real no-go zone for Renamo and it nor cares to become established there. Election violence claims may make sense but the risk of continuing to lose will be greater if the organizational work does not start early and persistently.
In Inhambane, electoral results point to higher turnout the polls ever, hovering between 80-90% in favor of the ruling party; atypical thing for the standard of participation, which does not exceed 50%. Why does it happen? Lack of tax, absence of representatives, lack of political work by Renamo. However much we blame the government for fraud or do nothing to stop the election violence; or the electoral management bodies to be permissive fraud is especially Renamo that falls the responsibility to organize the best way to change the disadvantage. Indeed, the southern part is that in fact gives victory to Frelimo, since the clearance system is the sum of valid votes.
THIRD: Leadership: lead the opposition opinion and the masses. Because of items 1 and 2 above, although Renamo continue to have greater acceptance across the country, it is curiously disengaged a party of the masses. As the largest party in opposition, she had an obligation to lead the opposition opinion. What we see is oddly one Babylonian where even the ruling party joins some opposition parties whenever it likes, manipulating them in prejudice to the opposition. Rethink the Renamo leadership role will involve taking its role as leader of the opposition opinion. And that Renamo know perfectly how to do and what to do.
ROOM: Courage to be the first to change. The Renamo leader and the people are aware of the "evil government of Frelimo". There is not the slightest doubt. However, not enough to know this. And be limited to detailing the evil of the enemy is not to make good policy. The only alternative left for Renamo, if you want to come forward, is to have the courage to change. Changing, surprising the opponent to take the necessary advantages, can leave a choked Frelimo, then this time going through one of its worst internal crisis after the death of Eduardo Mondlane in 1969! But this requires courage; courage to proceed with a new and renewing politics, inspiring the masses; courage to assume its role as leader of the opposition opinion; NEW THINGS TO DO courage. I said, DO THINGS OF COURAGE BRIDES and differently
Both Frelimo and Renamo, the secret lies in being the first to come forward in changing the way of doing politics, including concessions that the game may seem exaggerated. Gone are the times when it was favored ZERO SUM game theories. Now all should strive for the scenario WIN-WIN. Accept losing to earn a little together consolidate peace.

It's possible.
(EGIDIO VAZ/historian)

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